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Introduction 
Eileen Brennan 
Most unusually for Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies, this is not a thematic issue. 
Nonetheless, it is not impossible to identify common interests among the contributors, all but one 
of whom turn to Ricœur for support in developing a project that they are truly passionate about. 
The exception to the rule is a contributor who wants to explore how Ricœur managed to execute 
one of his own projects: transposing concepts that were originally employed in Freudian 
psychoanalysis to the area of Memory Studies. In what follows I offer a reasonably detailed 
introduction to each of the papers in turn. 
Johann Michel’s “The Anthropology of Homo Interpretans” reopens the discussion on 
whether it really makes sense to view Paul Ricœur’s entire work as “a kind of philosophical 
anthropology held together by a narrative thread, namely, an attempt to answer Kant’s famous 
question: What is man”? and it does so in order to extend, refine and deepen that discussion. The 
question that motivates Michel, on this occasion, is the following: “in what way and to what 
extent can Ricœur’s anthropology be described as hermeneutic or interpretive”? It seems to me 
that the phrasing of that question could give rise to a misunderstanding. Michel does not in fact 
hold that all of Ricœur’s works are “directly” anthropological, and that all that remains for him to 
do is establish the part that interpretation plays in Ricœur’s “description of mankind.” As his 
article clearly demonstrates, Michel draws a relatively clear distinction between “Ricœur’s first 
published works,” including Freedom and Nature, on the one hand, and the two volumes that 
comprise Finitude and Guilt as well as various other later publications, on the other hand. He 
maintains that the former provide examples of an “indirect anthropology,” which is not 
“interpretive,” whilst the latter are directly anthropological and, in the case of the Symbolism of 
Evil at any rate, employ a “hermeneutic [which] also leaves room for an anthropology of man as 
an interpreting being, as an ordinary person faced with symbols and signs with double meanings 
(stain, sin, guilt).”  
It is certainly the case that Michel’s analysis of Ricœur’s texts is fine grained, not only 
when it comes to identifying the type of anthropology to be found in a given work (“direct,” 
“indirect,” “an anthropology of vulnerability” or “an anthropology of capability,”) but also when 
it comes to identifying the type of hermeneutics to be found there (“methodological and 
epistemological,” “ontological” or indeed “anthropological.”) Not surprisingly, given the title of 
the piece, Michel is most interested in the examples of, or resources for, anthropological 
hermeneutics that are to be found across Ricœur’s many works. In the first part of the article, he 
sets out to demonstrate that “Ricœur’s hermeneutics provides useful resources (the hermeneutics 
of symbols, the hermeneutics of texts, the hermeneutics of action, [and] the hermeneutics of the 
self) for developing an interpretive anthropology.” However, he also points out its limitations in 
that regard: “even if one can discern an interpretive anthropology, it sometimes suffers from 
being too closely pegged to the model of the text, and more generally to permanently fixed 
expressions of life, whereas an interpretive anthropology also needs to be attentive to 
problematic, unfamiliar action in the making, as revealed to us in all its event-driven, indexical 
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glory.” Michel then devotes the second half of his article to tracing a certain path, one that he 
describes as, the “historic, cultural and social conditions—as well as variations—that have 
brought Homo interpretans about,” and he does this precisely because an anthropology of Homo 
interpretans presupposes such an account.  Although this tracing of the historic, cultural and 
social conditions which give rise to Homo interpretans is intended to supplement Ricœur’s 
valuable but nonetheless limited contribution to anthropological hermeneutics, Michel does not 
encourage his readers to view this ‘schematization’ as any kind of critique or counterpart to 
Ricœurian hermeneutics. It is, he says, simply a matter of “taking Ricœur’s initiative further.” 
Hille Haker’s “No Space. Nowhere. Refugees and the Problem of Human Rights in 
Arendt and Ricœur” makes an early reference to a particularly thought-provoking claim of 
Ricœur’s: ”It is as citizens that we become humans.” I presume that the purpose of quoting that 
particular line is to help us understand why we ought to be very deeply concerned about the 
plight of the hundreds of millions of people worldwide who have had to flee their countries of 
origin, thus losing any citizens’ rights they may have had. However, as the title of her article 
indicates, Haker is really more concerned with human rights. Drawing on works by Ricœur, 
Arendt, and others she sets herself the challenging task of deciphering “the human rights 
question as it relates to those people who flee from the political space in which they may or may 
not have de jure citizens’ rights but certainly have lost them de facto.” She is especially interested 
in what Arendt has to say about stateless persons and the problem of their being accorded human 
rights whilst being denied political rights. 
In the first part of her paper, Haker discusses Arendt’s “reservations, if not opposition, to 
the Human Rights Regime that became the guiding framework of international relations after 
World War II.” On Haker’s account: “Arendt reads the reference to inalienable human rights [in 
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights] … as ‘merely’ natural rights, namely as 
unconnected to any right to political membership.” Arendt argues that because they are 
“separated from the political sphere, human rights are merely abstract rights that cannot be 
enforced.” It is in the second part of her paper that Haker approaches the question of Paul 
Ricœur’s position relative to Arendt’s often “bitter” critique of “the Human Rights regime,” and 
she does so by way of “a detour through his ethical theory.” She makes the following 
observation: “Ricœur would be opposed to Arendt’s claim that all that matters is the right to 
membership in the polity; the human condition as zoon politikon, the political nature of sharing 
each other’s lives in a polity that is today the global polity, is not as decisive for Ricœur’s concept 
as it is for Arendt’s.” She notes that the key concepts in Ricœur’s ethical theory are “recognition 
and responsibility, i.e. the capability to respond and the necessity to be held accountable and hold 
others accountable.” She claims that these concepts and the analyses associated with them 
provide a promising “ethical underpinning” for the political. 
In the third part of her paper, Haker takes a more direct approach, considering what 
Ricœur has to say about “Arendt’s theory of power.” She notes that, like Arendt before him, 
Ricœur calls for a move “from violence to creative power.” However, in opposition to Arendt, he 
justifies it in terms of the moral responsibility that all human beings have to do as Aeneas did and 
“carry the burden of others on their shoulders.” The following is an example of the erudition, but 
also the passion, with which Haker writes: “Aeneas, by the way, is one of the many refugees the 
Greek and Roman mythology remembers in its narrative configurations. Being vulnerable 
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himself, Aeneas, fleeing and having lost all rights, is still carrying his father on his back. He, not 
the Roman civitas or the “Founding Fathers” of the American Revolution [a reference to Arendt’s 
analysis], is Ricœur’s founding figure of human rights—a human being who does not lose his 
dignity in transit, because he does not lose his capability to respond. If this vulnerable agent is 
capable of responding to another’s need and aim to live a good life, how much more are others, 
not in transit, capable of responding”? 
The title of Marc De Leeuw’s article is, “Paul Ricœur’s Search for a Just Community: The 
Phenomenological Presupposition of a Life “With and for Others.” It is described as “an 
exploratory paper, part of a larger study on Ricœur’s legal philosophy that focuses on the 
philosophical presuppositions of law and justice.” The article takes seriously Sophie Loidolt’s 
claim that “a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity… opens up the foundation and 
existential dimensions of our legal community,” and it sets out to establish that there are 
important phenomenological aspects to Ricœur’s own, very distinctive conceptualization of 
intersubjectivity, i.e., intersubjectivity understood as “a complex intertwining of moral selfhood 
and a just community.” Its stated aim is “to examine how Ricœur’s critique of Husserl’s and 
Levinas’s notions of intersubjectivity informs his own alternative conceptualization of 
intersubjectivity.” The broader intention is, I assume, to demonstrate that Ricœur’s “alternative 
conception of intersubjectivity” fits neatly into the frame of Loidolt’s thesis on the potential that 
phenomenology holds both for clarifying concepts and problems in jurisprudence and for 
developing critical legal theory. 
Esteban Lythgoe’s “How Does Paul Ricœur Apply Metapsychology to Collective 
Memory”? sets out to explain how Ricœur finally managed to draw together two areas of 
interest: psychoanalysis and history. More particularly, it tries to reconstruct Ricœur’s complex 
strategy for transposing what, in Freud and Philosophy, he had termed representation’s “twofold 
expressivity,” i.e., “the dialectic of knowledge and desire in representation,” from the level of the 
ego to that of survivors and their collective memory. As the article explains, it was in the 1990s 
that historians began to study “the testimonies of survivors of traumatic events, especially the 
Holocaust…[paying] attention to the effects of these events in the survivors’ communities and 
[on] their memories rather than describing the past ‘the way it happened.’” The article goes on to 
say that as “a contribution to this approach to history … Ricœur applied some of the conclusions 
of his work on Freud.” However, initially at any rate, Ricœur faced a significant challenge 
because his earlier work on Freud had emphasized “the Freudian libidinal economy,” something 
that “hindered” him in his efforts to effect that transposition. The working hypothesis of 
Lythgoe’s article is that Ricœur overcame the difficulty in two steps: “The first one gathered 
psychoanalysis and history within the larger framework of otherness as flesh. The second step 
was a transcendental turn, which would lead Ricœur to inquire about the structures of collective 
existence that make it possible to apply psychoanalytic categories at that level [i.e., the level of 
collective memory]…” 
Duygu Onay Çoker’s “Towards an Ethical Hermeneutics of Journalism” opens with a 
powerful testimony. It describes how the life of a young child was negatively impacted by the 
effective partition of the island of Cyprus in 1974. It explains that, during the early 1980s at any 
rate, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots could not “directly interact with one another… and 
thus [the author tells us] children like me learned the stories of the “other” through our parents 
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and had them reinforced in school and by the media. Although we all were living within spitting-
distance of each other, especially in the divided capital city Nicosia/Lefkoşa, many generations 
grew up with this division fuelled by our own dominant national narratives.” The paper 
proposes a double critique―“personal/ societal”―which makes creative use of selected 
Ricœurian themes (narrative, the creativity of language, and linguistic hospitality) and whose 
purpose is decidedly ethical. One aspect of the double critique involves taking up the perspective 
of critical media studies and problematizing “the issue of otherness in the news.” Inspired by a 
Ricœurian ethics of hospitality, it recommends making the language used by the media more 
hospitable to the “other,” thus, “repositioning both news organizations and news items alike 
within Ricœur’s ethical paradigm of leading a good life with and for others in just institutions.” 
I would like to thank all those who worked behind the scenes, preparing this issue for 
publication, especially Jean-Luc Amalric and Azadeh Thiriez-Arjangi, but also the contributors, 
the members of our Editorial Board who reviewed the paper submissions, and the staff of the 
University Library System at the University of Pittsburgh who provided technical support.  
